Back to News
IInkludX Editorial
·16 November 2026·🇳🇴🇸🇪🇩🇰

The opportunity cost of exclusion: Norway in a European perspective

When economists talk about opportunity cost, they mean the value of the best alternative you give up. Applied to labour market exclusion, the question is not only "what do benefits cost?" but "what do we lose when people who could work are outside work?" — lost output, lost tax revenue, and, increasingly in Norway, lost hands in health and care services.

A new report by Kåre Hagen of OsloMet, commissioned by NHO Geneo, puts that question at the centre. Its main claim: Norway's welfare problem is not a shortage of money, but a shortage of people. This article sets Hagen's argument against what Norway's own auditors, the OECD and comparable European countries show.


1. The visible bill: benefits

Norway's spending on health-related benefits is high by any standard.

  • The 2025 state budget set aside NOK 255 billion for sickness benefit, work assessment allowance (AAP) and disability benefit. As a share of mainland GDP, Norway spends almost four times the OECD average on health-related benefits (government spending review by Oslo Economics, the Frisch Centre and OsloMet, June 2025).
  • According to the OECD's 2026 Economic Survey of Norway, sickness and disability spending makes up around 22% of total public spending, or more than 8% of mainland GDP.
  • NAV and the Directorate of Health expect spending on these benefits to grow from NOK 243 billion in 2023 to NOK 262 billion by 2033 (in 2025 kroner).
  • The OECD's Restoring Public Finances (May 2026) notes that sickness and disability spending in Norway, as a share of GDP, is nearly six times higher than in Ireland — and that health status cannot explain such large differences.

Compared with our neighbours

InkludX has compiled public disability and sickness cash benefits on a common definition (employer-paid sick pay excluded, latest year available):

| Country | Share of GDP | Per person aged 15–64 |

|---|---|---|

| Norway (2024) | 4.5% | €5,734 |

| Denmark (2024) | 3.4% | €3,598 |

| Germany (2023) | 2.0% | €1,573 |

| Sweden (2024) | 1.5% | €1,281 |

The definitions differ in detail between national systems, so the comparison should be read as an order of magnitude. But the gap is large. Reforms elsewhere show that the inflow can be brought down: in the Netherlands, annual inflow into disability benefit fell from 1.5% of the labour force at the end of the last century to 0.5% in 2022; Sweden tightened its criteria for long-term disability benefit in a reform on 1 July 2008. Full figures and sources are on our fiscal cost of exclusion pages.


2. The hidden bill: lost work

Benefits are a transfer: the money stays in the economy. The real economic loss is the work that does not happen. Several European countries now estimate it directly.

  • United Kingdom: The Department for Work and Pensions estimates that working-age ill-health and disability that prevents work cost the UK economy £240–330 billion in 2022, up from £114–149 billion in the 2016 estimate. Lost output from economic inactivity alone has a central estimate of £132 billion, and tax and National Insurance foregone is £57 billion.
  • Germany: The Federal Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (BAuA) estimates that sickness absence in 2024 — 881.5 million days of incapacity, 20.8 per employee — cost €134 billion in lost production and €227 billion in lost gross value added.
  • Norway: A Vista Analyse report for the Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion (2025) puts the socio-economic cost of women's work-related ill-health, sickness absence and dropout from work at NOK 59 billion a year. Bringing women's sickness absence down to men's level would be worth NOK 19 billion a year.

These estimates use different methods and are not directly comparable. Together they show that the loss of output is of the same order as, or larger than, the benefits bill.


3. The Norwegian twist: the cost is people

This is where Hagen's report adds something. In Norway, he argues, the scarce resource is not money to pay benefits, but people to deliver the personal welfare services the population is entitled to. That changes what the opportunity cost of exclusion means: every person outside work who could have worked is also a missing nurse's assistant, care worker or kindergarten employee.

His numbers:

  • Norway has fallen from one of Europe's highest employment rates at the start of the 2000s to 7th place. For people aged 20–66 who do not have an immigrant background, the employment rate was 79.8% in 2001 and 79.3% in 2024 — practically flat despite more than two decades of Inclusive Working Life agreements.
  • A 10% reduction in sick leave and in the number of people on AAP and disability benefit would save NOK 25 billion. If those people worked half-time on average, it would add value equivalent to 35,000 full-time jobs (Hagen, citing Andersen 2026).
  • If every municipality had sick leave in health and care as low as the best 20%, the services would gain 10,800 full-time equivalents — without higher public spending.
  • There are 105,000 young people under 30 outside work and education.

Norway already spends heavily trying to fix this: Hagen's rough guess is NOK 50–60 billion a year on inclusion services. Yet exclusion has not fallen in three decades. The OECD reaches a similar conclusion from the fiscal side and urges a comprehensive reform, modelling the gains from cutting disability benefit recipients from 14% to 10% of the working-age population and sickness absence from around 27 to 18 days per full-time employee a year.


What Norway's own auditors say

The Office of the Auditor General (Riksrevisjonen) has reached conclusions close to Hagen's in a series of audits.

  • Preventing dropout from work (Dokument 3:5 (2025–2026), November 2025) — rated kritikkverdig (open to criticism). The goals of reducing dropout from working life and reducing sick leave have not been met. Disability benefit, AAP and sickness benefit together cost NOK 240 billion, 12.5% of state budget spending. In December 2024, 158,500 people received AAP and 373,000 disability benefit — 15% of the population aged 18–66. Sick leave rose from 5.6% in 2015 to 6.8% in 2024. AAP recipients who have not worked wait on average at least 17 months before starting a labour market programme.
  • Young people outside work (Dokument 3:17 (2023–2024), August 2024) — also kritikkverdig. The number of young people on disability benefit more than doubled, from 10,400 in 2013 to 21,800 in 2023, and 8.3% of all 18–29-year-olds received a health-related benefit at the end of 2023 — a higher share than in other OECD countries. Among those needing specially adapted support, only 16% were in work or education six months later. "We cannot afford for so many young people to fall out of working life," said Auditor General Karl Eirik Schjøtt-Pedersen. "Noreg treng arbeidskrafta deira" — Norway needs their labour.
  • Health and care capacity: Citing the government's long-term perspectives, Riksrevisjonen notes that Norway will need 180,000 more people employed in health and care by 2060, which means labour shortages, and that future challenges cannot be met without higher productivity (October 2025). Its audit of services for older people (May 2026) found that although staffing and activity in municipalities grew from 2015 to 2024, fewer people over 80 received home care and fewer used nursing homes — while the number of over-80s will have risen by 50% by 2033 compared with 2024.
  • Money versus results (Dokument 3:15 (2025–2026), June 2026): the state lacks systematic information on the link between resource use and results — rated ikke tilfredsstillende (not satisfactory).

In other words, the auditors confirm the three pillars of Hagen's argument: inclusion efforts are not delivering, the young are the fastest-growing group outside work, and the binding constraint in welfare services is people.


4. What works — and what it returns

If opportunity cost is the problem, the question is which measures convert benefit recipients into workers at a reasonable cost. The European evidence points the same way as Hagen's "flip the perspective" argument: place people in work first, then support them.

  • Individual Placement and Support (IPS), Netherlands: A nationwide study of people with severe mental illness on sickness or disability benefits (BMJ Public Health, 2024) matched 863 IPS participants with 16,466 in traditional vocational rehabilitation. IPS raised the chance of competitive work by 3.7–7.5 percentage points and was, on average, cost saving for society and the benefit payer — though the uncertainty was large.
  • Prompt Mental Health Care, Norway: In a randomised trial followed up in registers for up to five years (Psychological Medicine, 2025), participants were more likely to be in regular work without benefits. The benefit–cost ratio was estimated at 5.26, while the difference in public spending was small.

Hagen adds two proposals aimed at the incentives: make it genuinely profitable for both employers and people on AAP or disability benefit to start an employment relationship — for example by letting a person give part of their benefit as a wage subsidy — and move tasks in short-staffed care services into jobs designed for people who struggle to get ordinary work.


The bottom line

Seen from Europe, Norway's problem is not that it is generous. It is that it pays twice: once through one of the highest benefit bills in Europe, and again through the work, tax revenue and care capacity it forgoes. The countries that have brought inflow down did it by changing how systems work, not just by spending more. For employers, the implication is direct: if the next generation of care workers and colleagues is to come from those now outside work, inclusion has to happen in the workplace — and it has to pay for both sides.


Sources

Share this article

Related News